This paper investigates the dynamics between the credit market freedom counterparts of the economic freedom index drawn from the Fraser institute database and bank cost efficiency levels across the U.S. states. We consider a sample of 3,809 commercial banks per year, on average, over the period 1987-2012. After estimating cost efficiency scores using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we develop a fractional regression model to test the implications of financial freedom for bank efficiency. Our results indicate that banks operating in states that enjoy a higher degree of economic freedom are more cost efficient. Greater independence in financial and banking markets from government controls can result in higher bank efficiency. This effect emerges in addition to the efficiency enhancing effects of interstate banking and intrastate branching deregulation.
Introduction
Over the recent decades the banking system in the United States (U.S.) went through many phases characterized by various levels or regulatory intensity. In the early 1980s financial intermediation took place in the presence of the Glass-Steagall Act, regulation Q, and restrictions on branching and interstate banking activities. A process of interstate banking deregulation was completed by mid 1990s, although adaptation to the Riegle-Neal act was slow. 1 The ensuing wave of consolidation increased the average bank size and allowed banks to expand into new markets by operating larger branch networks or bank holding companies. Moreover, by 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act regarding the affiliation between banks and securities firms. The financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008 was followed by financial regulatory reform spearheaded by the Dodd-Frank Act. Nevertheless banking regulation across the U.S. states remains highly fractionalized to date (Bernanke, 2015) .
A growing literature exists assessing the effects of various forms of banking regulation (e.g., capital regulation, supervision, activity restrictions, etc.) on the efficiency of financial institutions. 2 As Barth et al. (2013) observe, however, the limited data availability on concrete measures of various bank regulations impedes the achievement of a comprehensive analysis on bank regulation and oversight.
Various types of data exists attempting to measure the degree and tightness of restrictions on financial institutions' activities. La Porta et al. (1998; 2000) , for example, consider financial liberalization, while Barth et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2013) produce detailed data on bank regulation, supervision and monitoring for a large number of countries. A limited but developing literature uses the financial counterparts of the indices that measure economic freedom either as control variables in bank A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT performance analyses (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Chortareas et al., 2011) or as key determinants of bank efficiency (Giannone et al., 2011) . Recent empirical evidence by Chortareas et al. (2013) indicate that excessive government interference in the financial institutions activities, as reflected in low scores of the financial freedom indices, exert a negative impact on bank efficiency. Their results also suggest that banks operating in countries characterized by good governance and policies that promote financial freedom may result in a more efficient resource allocation process and a more effective management.
The analysis is based on a sample of banks operating in 27 European Union (EU) countries from 2001 to 2009 (6,744 observations) . Yet, the recent global financial crisis has put the discussion regarding governments' interference in the financial system on a new basis.
Abundant evidence exists on the efficiency of U.S. banks. Part of this literature analyses the effects of bank integration within the U.S. as well as of branching and intrastate banking deregulation on bank efficiency (e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 2001; Morgan et. al., 2004 Jeon and Miller, 2007; Zou et. al., 2011) . To our knowledge, however, no evidence exists on how the degree of a state's financial freedom, typically measured by "freedom indices", may affect bank efficiency. This paper explicitly considers how the tightness of the regulatory environment, as captured by the financial freedom indices may affect bank performance. To proxy the regulatory environment we use the indices of freedom for the U.S. states, constructed by the Fraser Institute, focusing on the financial counterparts of the freedom indices.
In particular, we consider the credit market freedom index, which measures the degree of financial and banking markets' independence from government control. Moreover, we account for the effects of other freedom indices, capturing related dimensions, whose effects may complement those of the credit market freedom index. In testing the above hypothesis we use bank specific, deregulation, and crises controls. The rationale for the hypothesized relationship between financial freedom measures and bank performance emanates from basic tenets of economic theory: the freer financial institutions are from various restrictions in pursuing their business the more efficiently they will organize their operations in order to minimize costs/maximize profits (Chortareas et. al., 2013) . We focus on the concept of cost efficiency, which is typically the focus of efficiency analysis studies. Moreover, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis achieving high levels of efficiency on the cost side has become a critical factor for the ability of financial institutions to compete and survive.
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We obtain efficiency scores for banks operating in the U.S. using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) over the period 1987-2012, utilizing a large and unique sample of 99,032 commercial bank M A N U S C R I P T
observations. We then regress the efficiency estimates on the economic freedom indices and their financial counterparts employing the Papke and Wooldridge's (1996) 'fractional logit' estimator. Our analysis controls for bank-specific variables including capitalization, the relative size of the institutions, the quality of bank loans, and a proxy for off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities exposure. In addition, we consider other deregulator indicators and crises dummies to account for environmental changes and for robustness purposes. An extensive literature on bank efficiency exists. 4 The ability of financial institutions to remain efficient is vital for their very existence, the ability to deliver services to consumers, and the financial system's stability. The more efficient financial institutions are, the higher the level of expected profitability and service quality for consumers. In addition, if the efficiency savings are directed towards improving capital buffers that absorb risk one would expect a higher degree of safety and soundness for the financial system as a whole.
Our results indicate that there is a strong link between credit market freedom and bank cost efficiency. In particular, the higher the degree of a state's credit market freedom, the better the banks'
performance is in terms cost efficiency. The evidence also suggests that the deregulation process that took place during the 80s and 90s has improved the efficient operation of banks, with the efficiency gains being more pronounced in states with freer market systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and empirical methodology, Section 3 discusses the empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
Data and methodology
4 For comprehensive survey see Berger (2007) ; Goddard et al. (2010) ; Hughes and Mester (2010).
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Data sources
To construct our data set we take balance sheet data of commercial banks from the quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income filed by commercial banks, known as "Call Repots". Call reports are prepared at the level of bank, with each commercial bank uniquely identified by the report item RSSD9001. We focus on commercial banks operating in the 48 states 5 of the U.S. over the period 1987-2012. 6 Given that the DEA efficiency measures can be sensitive to the presence of outliers and data errors, we run the data through a substantial screening and editing process as suggested by Berger and Mester (1997) in order to assure a high degree of credibility for the emerging efficiency indices ("super-efficient" observations). Implementing such screening methods, results in an unbalanced panel of 99,032 observations.
The time and size distributions of banks included in the estimation of the efficiency frontier are shown in Table 1 . As illustrated in Table 1 Sturm, 2000; Chortareas et al., 2013) . In this paper we use the Economic Freedom of North America which is the only comprehensive economic freedom database that presents the ratings for U.S. by state. 7 In particular, we focus on the "credit market regulation" component counterparts of the economic freedom index, which captures the degree of regulatory tightness in finance. The variables of economic freedom range from 0, for "no freedom", to 10 for "maximum freedom". In order to capture the broader regulatory environment within which economic activity takes place, we also consider the other two sub-components of the "regulation" counterpart of the freedom index, namely "labor regulation" and "business regulation". We discuss these "regulation" variables and we provide detailed information on the economic freedom variables used in our empirical analysis in Appendix B (Table B .1).
Estimating cost efficiency: the DEA approach
To examine the impact of economic and credit market freedom on bank efficiency, we use a two-stage approach. The first stage consists in deriving DEA cost efficiency scores for the banks in our sample. In the second stage we regress the cost efficiency scores against the available indices of economic freedom, as well as on a set of bank specific and deregulation control variables.
DEA employs a linear programming framework and, by making some fairly general assumptions about the underlying production technology, yields an estimate of the Farrell's (1957) efficiency measure for each bank in the sample. This paper uses the input-oriented DEA with Variable Returns to 7 Another index of economic freedom across the US states is that provided by the Mercatus Center but the economic freedom counterpart of this index is a synthetic index of "fiscal policy" and "regulatory policy" where the last does not cover the financial sector. Banks' cost efficiencies are measured relative to a common frontier by pooling the data across states estimated separately for each year. This approach allows us to estimate efficiency differentials not only between commercial banks within a state but across states as well using the same benchmark.
That is we adopt the "intermediation approach" (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) which views banks as intermediaries that employ labor, capital, and deposits to produce different types of loan accounts.In order to estimate cost efficiency, we need to compute input prices. The price of labor is obtained by dividing salaries and employee benefits by the number of employees. The cost of physical capital is calculated as expenses on premises and fixed assets divided by premises and fixed assets. The price of deposits is derived as interest expenses divided by total deposits. Finally, to construct the output series we specify two variables that capture the traditional lending (consumer loans) and non-lending activities of banks (business loans-all other loans), as well as their non-traditional activities (total securities).
Capturing the non-traditional activities of banks is essential given the increased involvement of commercial banks in fee generating items. We present the descriptive statistics for outputs, inputs and their respective prices in Table 2. <Insert Table 2 about here>
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Regression framework
The second stage of our analysis, consists in uncovering, by means of regression methods, the underlying relationship between the estimated cost efficiency levels and the economic freedom indices while controlling for bank specific factors, deregulation and crises indicators. Specifically, we estimate the following equations:
EFF , is the managerial cost efficiency measure, measuring how far the bank is from the estimated efficient frontier. In other words, this is a relative measure, which implies that the best-practice banks are by definition one hundred per cent efficient, while the others are characterized as inefficient relative to them. The vector i H contains the indicators of economic freedom in state i , k i B , is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for each bank k in state i , and t YEAR is an annual dummy variable controlling inter alia for other macroeconomic and technical changes. i REGION is a regional dummy 9 controlling for systematic differences across states (Clark, 1998) , and k i,  is the error term.
9 Clark (1998) provides evidence that region-specific components are significant for the cyclical variation in the major regions of the U.S. The nine regions have been constructed based on the United States Census Bureau grouping which is the most commonly used classification system for large nations (such as the U.S.), with its diverse physical and cultural geography and its numerous State components. Appendix A, (2004) 10 . By doing so, we want to prevent our credit market freedom variable from capturing the effects of these regional deregulation indicators. Finally, we consider the impact of the savings and loans crisis and the recent financial crisis by introducing the dummy i CRISES .
To estimate equations (2a) and (2b) The vector H i of equation 2a contains the variables accounting for economic freedom from the Fraser Institute's (2014) database. Specifically, we define the vector H i as follows: and Chortareas et, al. (2013) . In order to control for all components of the regulatory quality, the vector H i also includes the sub-components pertaining to "business freedom" ( i BUSINESS ) and "labor freedom" ( i LABOR ). The "business freedom" variable is a proxy of the ability to establish and run a business without interference from the government. Burdensome and redundant regulatory rules are the most common barriers to the free conduct of business activities. Higher values of the "labor freedom" index reflect a high degree of protection in the labor market with possible direct or indirect effects on the cost of labor inputs and therefore on the cost efficiency of the financial institutions.
To capture a state's broader environment within which economic activity takes place, the vector 
In particular the vector k i B , , as specified in equation (4), includes a set of bank-specific factors that might influence the efficiency of a particular bank included in the second-stage regression model.
We consider all the bank-specific variables, which one usually encounters in efficiency analyses, namely:
(i) the equity over total assets ratio ( alia, for other macroeconomic, technological and regional changes in the economy. <Insert Table 3 about here>
Results
Cost efficiency levels
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We measure the banks' cost efficiency levels relative to a common frontier by pooling the data across states estimated separately for each year. This approach allows us to estimate efficiency differentials not only between commercial banks within a state but also across states using the same benchmark. The average estimated cost efficiencies relative to the whole sample are presented in Figure   1 . Table 4 also reports the bank efficiency levels averaged for the whole period for each state in the sample.
<Insert Figure 1 and Table 4 
about here>
Since the DEA results show relatively high cost inefficiency (levels of about 27%) there is still plenty of room for improvement in the way banks in the U.S. control their production costs (e.g. Berger and Mester, 1999) . The mean efficiencies reported here are in accordance with previous studies in the U.S. area. In particular, cost efficiency scores display a decreasing trend between 1989 and 1993, possibly reflecting the major losses the U.S. banks have suffered due to the savings and loan associations (S&L) crisis. Following that, there is a peak in 2005 and then weakening over the following years. Overall, as it is apparent from figure 1, cost efficiency scores display a downward trend over the entire period considered.
Freedom and cost efficiency
In this second stage of the analysis, we look into the effects of economic and financial freedom on bank cost efficiency, while controlling for the effects of other relevant bank-specific and environmental factors. Following Papke and Wooldridge's (1996) quasi-likelihood estimation method,
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we estimate Equations (2a) and (2b) using a fractional logit process with robust standard errors. The results from equation (2a) are provided in Table 5 .
<Insert Table 5 about here>
The columns in Table 5 correspond to the results of different model specifications focusing on alternative economic freedom variables, while controlling for a selected set of relevant bank-specific variables frequently employed in banking studies. In particular, the first column in Table 5 reports the basic regression model that includes the credit market freedom variable and bank-specific control variables (model 1). The next five columns include alternative economic freedom control variables one at a time (models 2-6). To avoid problems of multicollinearity we include economic freedom variables one by one (models 1-6). All components of the financial freedom indices appear to have a positive and statistically significant effect on bank efficiency. In terms of magnitude this effect is more pronounced when the "credit freedom" and "business freedom" are considered. The variable capturing assessments of "labor freedom" has a limited effect as expected since its potential impact on efficiency can is transmitted indirectly. Thus, the evidence from the exploratory analysis corresponding to specification (2a) suggests that constraints on business and labor, as reflected on these sub-components of the "regulation" counterpart of the freedom index, may result in an inefficient resource allocation process.
In particular, the coefficients of i BUSINESS and i LABOR are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that banks in states with less government bureaucracy, fewer difficulties in starting a new business, and fewer price controls and labor market restrictions tend to have higher cost efficiency levels.
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The results also document a strong link between bank efficiency and government size, property rights and freedom to trade internationally. Excessive government spending often leads to inefficiency, possibly through the channels of bureaucracy, waste, and lower productivity. Moreover, banks in states where the overall environment is conducive to the protection of the private sector property rights and the financial system is characterized by relatively high levels of openness tend to have higher efficiency These results are broadly in line with recent empirical international evidence considering the implications of financial freedom indices (e.g., Chortareas et al., 2013) and/or liberalization and reforms in the financial sector (Barrell et al., 2015) .
Indeed, one would expect that a higher degree of restrictions and government controls in the financial and banking markets can have a significant role in reducing banks' cost efficiency scores. Banks in states with more open credit markets may be more likely to engage in competitive policies, thus achieving higher levels of cost efficiencies.
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<Insert Table 6 about here>
The specification of estimation of equation (2b) and the corresponding results shown in Table 6 take explicitly into account the deregulation and crises indicators. In particular, we consider the credit market freedom, our proxy of financial and banking freedom, along with an index of interstate banking deregulation index ( Turning to the bank-specific control variables which appear in all specifications (Tables 5 and 6) , we find that the equity over total assets ratio ( k i EQAS , ) variable has a significantly positive sign suggesting that higher capital ratios are associated with more efficient bank operations. This finding is consistent with the argument that higher capitalization contributes to alleviating agency problems between managers and shareholders (Mester, 1996) . As in most cases efficiency is positively related to bank size, which in our models is manifested by a positive and statistically significant sign for the coefficient of the quadratic term of ( k i LNTA , ), implying a non-linear relationship between bank size
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and efficiency. This finding is also consistent with the results of previous studies (Stavarek, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007) . The exposure to OBS activities is negatively related to cost efficiency suggesting that banks which are more focused on non-traditional banking business are on average less efficient.
Finally, the lending quality variable display a positive relationship with bank efficiency but this link is weak since the relevant coefficient is not statistically significant.
Overall, it appears that economic freedom is a key element of the environment within which financial institutions operate. More credit market freedom seems to be associated with higher cost efficiency scores in U.S. banking. Furthermore, when controlling for deregulation our results reveal a strong link between the states deregulation and bank cost efficiency.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the relationship between the credit market freedom counterparts of the economic freedom indices and bank cost efficiency across the U.S. states. Our analysis covers an exceptionally lengthy period as compared to the typical sample dimensions used in bank efficiency studies and covers periods characterized by different degrees of financial regulation intensity. The credit market freedom index proxies the tightness of the regulatory environment. Moreover, we consider the effects of other relevant dimension of economic freedom, as measured by the Fraser Institute, on the cost efficiency of financial institutions. Such measures include business freedom, labor market freedom, and proxies for the legal system and property rights. That is, we test the hypothesis that a higher degree of "market friendliness" and greater independence in financial markets from government control allow banks to perform in a more efficient manner. After producing DEA cost efficiency scores for banks operating in 48 U.S. states between 1987 and 2012 (99,032 observations), we use a robust fractional logit estimator procedure to account for the effects of A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T ,364,860 7,552,411 7,206,915 4,173 195,088 11,919 ,349 1,067 9.37 0.85 A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values are derived using robust standard errors *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. P-Values are derived using robust standard errors *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
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Appendix B: This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating greater independence in financial and banking markets from government control. This includes ownership of banks (percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks), competition (the extent to which domestic banks face competition from foreign banks), extension of credit (percentage of credit extended to the private sector), and presence of interest rate controls. A score of 10 indicates repressive government interference, whereas a score of 0 a negligible one.
BUSINESS
Business freedom
This is a quantitative measure of the ability to start and operate a new business that represents the overall burden of bureaucracy as well as the efficiency of government in the regulatory process. This variable includes price controls, administrative conditions for new businesses, government bureaucracy, difficulties in starting a new business, irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications. The business freedom score ranges between 0 and 10, with 10 equalling the freest business environment.
LABOR
Labor market freedom This variable measures the extent to which labour market rigidities are present. It considers the impact of minimum wage regulation, the government employment as a percentage of total state employment, and the ability to form and join unions and its relation to public policy. This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating a freer labor market.
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SIZE
Size of government
This variable indicates the extent to which states rely on the political process to allocate resources, goods and services. When government spending increases relative to spending to individuals, households and businesses, government decision-making is substituted for personal choice and economic freedom is reduced. This variable is constructed using the following areas: General consumption expenditures by government as a percentage of GDP; Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP; Social security payments as a percentage of GDP; and Government enterprises and investment. Higher values indicate excessive government spending.
PROPERTY
Legal system and property rights
This variable measures the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It considers the following components: Judicial independence; Impartial courts; Protection of property rights; Military interference in rule of law and politics; Integrity of the legal system; Legal enforcement of contracts; Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property; Reliability of police; and Business costs of crime. This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating more certain legal protection of property.
TRADE
Freedom to trade internationally
This variable takes values between 0 and 10 with higher values indicating low tariffs, less regulatory trade barriers, few controls on the movement of capital and people and efficient administration of customs. This variable is constructed using the following areas: Tariffs; Regulatory trade barriers; Black-market exchange rates; and Controls of the movement of capital and people.
